Single Pilot Operations?
On February 17, 2024, an Airbus A321 operated by Lufthansa experienced a critical incident during its flight from Frankfurt, Germany, to Seville, Spain. The aircraft, carrying 205 people, was cruising over the Iberian Peninsula when the co-pilot suffered a sudden and severe medical incapacitation while alone in the cockpit. This event unfolded just moments after the captain had left the flight deck for physiological reasons, leaving the sole co-pilot in charge of the aircraft.
Until before the captain stepped out, the flight had been uneventful with the captain and co-pilot discussing weather conditions and operational details. A couple of minutes later the co-pilot became incapacitated due to a seizure disorder, a symptom of an undiagnosed neurological condition which had not been detected during routine medical examinations, or by the co-pilot himself. The sudden onset of the incapacitation left the co-pilot unable to alert the crew or respond to standard procedures. During the first 46 seconds of incapacitation, the co-pilot inadvertently operated some flight controls and switches, causing minor deviations, which were automatically corrected by the engaged autopilot, ensuring the aircraft continued on its planned route.
Co-pilot’s involuntary actions while incapacitated
“After the captain had left the cockpit and the co-pilot suffered the sudden and severe incapacitation, the aircraft flew for about 10 minutes in the cruise phase with the autopilot engaged but without additional supervision by either pilot”
A few minutes later the captain attempted to re-enter the cockpit but was unable to gain access using the standard procedure. After multiple attempts, and a lack of response from the co-pilot, the captain resorted to the emergency access code but, before the emergency timer expired, the co-pilot manage to manually open the cockpit door. The captain, observing the co-pilot pale, sweating, and moving strangely, regained control of the aircraft. A passenger doctor diagnosed a possible heart condition, prompting the captain to declare a medical emergency and divert the flight to the nearest suitable airport, Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas Airport. The aircraft landed safely, and the co-pilot was transported to a hospital for further evaluation.
This incident highlights the risks associated with a pilot being alone in the cockpit, even for brief periods. While regulations allow one pilot to leave the flight deck during the cruise phase for physiological reasons, the presence of another authorized person in the cockpit can hasten the detection of incapacitation and timely intervention. In this case, the co-pilot’s sudden incapacitation went unnoticed for several minutes, during which the aircraft operated without active supervision.
The investigation revealed that the co-pilot’s medical condition was undetectable during routine aeronautical medical examinations unless symptoms were present at the time of the check-up, or had manifested earlier. This underscores the challenges of predicting, and preventing, such medical events, particularly first-time seizures, which are rare but can occur without warning.
The incident also brought attention to the importance of having additional safety measures in place. If another authorized person, such as a cabin crew member, had been present in the cockpit, they could have quickly identified the co-pilot’s incapacitation, alerted the captain, and facilitated access to the flight deck. This would have allowed the captain to take control of the aircraft sooner, potentially reducing the risks associated with the delay.
Following the incident, the investigation recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) inform operators about the event, and encourage the Authority to reassess the risks of leaving one pilot alone in the cockpit. While some operators already require two authorized persons in the cockpit at all times, others have determined that this policy does not significantly enhance safety. However, this incident demonstrated the operational benefits of such a policy, particularly in mitigating the consequences of such sudden incapacitation.
The captain’s training in handling pilot incapacitation proved effective, enabling him to manage the situation and safely divert the aircraft. The aircraft itself performed as designed, with its automated systems maintaining the flight path, notwithstanding the co-pilot’s inadvertent actions on the controls.
This event serves as a reminder of the complexities of ensuring flight safety and the need for continuous evaluation of procedures and policies. While medical examinations aim to minimize the risk of in-flight incapacitation, they cannot eliminate it entirely. Therefore, operators must consider additional measures, such as requiring two authorized persons in the cockpit, to enhance safety and reduce the impact of rare but critical events like this one.
This incident highlights the vulnerabilities of single-pilot cockpit occupancy during flight, and the importance of swift intervention in cases of medical incapacitation. The safe resolution of the event was a testament to the effectiveness of pilot training and aircraft automation, but it also underscores the need for operators to reassess their policies to prevent similar occurrences in the future.
Read the full AESA report here: https://www.transportes.gob.es/recursos_mfom/comodin/recursos/in-001-2024_final-report_nm.pdf